Diversification, multimarket contacts and profits in the leasing industry

Degl’Innocenti, Marta, Claudia Girardone and Giuseppe Torluccio

Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 2014, vol. 31, issue C, 231-252

Abstract: This paper examines the competitive dynamics and multimarket characteristics of the Italian leasing industry. We employ a GMM-system estimator for dynamic panel analysis using a unique dataset over 2002–2008. Our main findings suggest that there is no evidence of tacit collusion in the Italian leasing sector thus rejecting the hypothesis that mutual forbearance affects market conditions through greater multimarket contact. The study offers no support to the assumption that similarity among firms facilitates collusive behaviour. Finally, the analysis reveals that on average the most profitable leasing firms are less diversified and have a better risk profile.

Keywords: Diversification; Multimarket contact; Leasing industry; Dynamic panel data; Lerner Index of monopoly power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C23 G20 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:intfin:v:31:y:2014:i:c:p:231-252

DOI: 10.1016/j.intfin.2014.04.001

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