LIBOR deception and central bank forward (mis-)guidance: Evidence from Norway during 2007–2011

Alexis Stenfors

Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 2014, vol. 32, issue C, 452-472

Abstract: This paper is an empirical investigation into the Norwegian Interbank Offered Rate (NIBOR) during 2007–11. It is demonstrated that an informal rule change to the benchmark fixing mechanism, instigated by the NIBOR panel banks, not only increased the susceptibility of the benchmark to deception, but also fundamentally changed the decomposition of the domestic money market risk premium. It resulted in a greater dependency on the Eurozone money markets and the ability of Eurozone banks to raise U.S. dollar funding. As a result, Norway faced both higher, and more volatile, money market risk premia since Q4 2008 – having considerable impact on forward guidance within monetary policy.

Keywords: LIBOR; Manipulation; Collusion; Forward guidance; Monetary policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 D7 E4 E5 F3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:intfin:v:32:y:2014:i:c:p:452-472

DOI: 10.1016/j.intfin.2014.07.006

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