Lead arranger reputation and the structure of loan syndicates

Sajid M. Chaudhry and Stefanie Kleimeier

Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 2015, vol. 38, issue C, 116-126

Abstract: This study explores the effects of information asymmetry and arranger reputations on syndicated loan structures. The moral hazard problem arising from information asymmetries between borrower and syndicate can be overcome only by the most reputable arrangers. Both moral hazard and adverse selection problems appear when arrangers have an information advantage over other syndicate participants. However, the adverse selection problem arises only when low-reputation arrangers lend to opaque borrowers.

Keywords: Syndicated loans; Syndicate structure; Information asymmetry; Reputation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042443115000748
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:intfin:v:38:y:2015:i:c:p:116-126

DOI: 10.1016/j.intfin.2015.05.021

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money is currently edited by I. Mathur and C. J. Neely

More articles in Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().