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Government ownership, financial constraint, corruption, and corporate performance: International evidence

Zulfiquer Ali Haider, Mingzhi Liu, Yefeng Wang and Ying Zhang

Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 2018, vol. 53, issue C, 76-93

Abstract: Using a sample of 8232 firms from 81 countries, we investigate the effect of government ownership on financial constraint and the effect of financial constraint on corporate performance. In addition, we address the moderating role of country-level corruption on those two relationships. Results show that government-owned firms face fewer financial constraints and that firms with fewer financial constraints perform better. Furthermore, we find that the association between government ownership and financial constraint and the association between financial constraint and corporate performance are less pronounced for firms operating in countries with a lower level of corruption.

Keywords: Government ownership; Financial constraint; Corruption; Performance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:intfin:v:53:y:2018:i:c:p:76-93

DOI: 10.1016/j.intfin.2017.09.012

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Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money is currently edited by I. Mathur and C. J. Neely

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