Corporate insider trading in Europe

Wolfgang Aussenegg, Ranko Jelic and Robert Ranzi

Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 2018, vol. 54, issue C, 27-42

Abstract: We analyse stock price behaviour around the disclosure of corporate insider transactions after the introduction of the Market Abuse Directive (MAD). Ranking according to our Insider Trading Enforcement (ITE) index highlights significant differences in the MAD enforcement between French and German legal origin countries. We document contrarian behaviour of insiders in all of the sample countries. Insiders reveal significant information to the public through both their purchases and sales. The price impact of the insiders’ transactions is particularly strong in countries with a lower ITE index (i.e. weaker public enforcement).

Keywords: Insider trading; Disclosure; Public enforcement; Crisis; Contrarian investors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G14 G15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:intfin:v:54:y:2018:i:c:p:27-42

DOI: 10.1016/j.intfin.2017.05.004

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