Organization capital, dividends and firm value: International evidence
Ioannis Chasiotis,
Georgios Loukopoulos and
Kanellos Toudas
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 2024, vol. 97, issue C
Abstract:
This study investigates the relationship between organization capital, dividends, and firm value across 61 countries. We find that firms with higher organization capital distribute more dividends. By exploiting changes in the stringency of national labor regulations, we demonstrate that this effect strengthens when labor markets become more flexible. Additionally, we document that the market places a premium on dividend payouts from firms with higher organization capital. Further analysis reveals that this premium differential and the positive organization capital-dividend payouts relationship, are more pronounced in firms and countries marked by substantial agency issues. The robustness of our evidence is affirmed through several endogeneity tests, supporting the agency view of organization capital.
Keywords: Organization capital; Intangible capital; Dividends; Payout policy; Firm value; Agency theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E22 G30 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:intfin:v:97:y:2024:i:c:s1042443124001409
DOI: 10.1016/j.intfin.2024.102074
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