Can governments make credible promises? Insights from infrastructure projects in emerging economies

Ravi Ramamurti

Journal of International Management, 2003, vol. 9, issue 3, 253-269

Abstract: Despite deregulation and privatization, governments in emerging economies continue to play important roles in private infrastructure projects, thereby exposing private investors to the risk of government reneging. The government's role as deal maker--and deal breaker--in infrastructure investments stems from its role as financier, customer, supplier, competitor, and/or regulator. (The only role governments have shed as a result of recent economic reforms is that of producer.) Based on the literature, I propose three explanations for government reneging: (1) economic uncertainty, which necessitates contract renegotiation; (2) the logic of the "obsolescing bargain," which makes deals less attractive to governments ex post than they were ex ante; and (3) political change, which puts new leaders in charge with incentives to renege on old promises. I assert that these risks can be contained, respectively, through contract design, investment strategy, and institutional design. Using this framework, I conclude that Enron's strategy in the controversial Dabhol project in India was sensitive to first of the three factors and relatively less mindful of the other two. The policy implication for MNCs is that they should be attentive to all three factors that cause government reneging rather than just one or two.

Keywords: Infrastructure; projects; Emerging; economies; Government; reneging (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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