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On the efficiency of vote buying when voters have common interests

Zvika Neeman () and Gerhard O. Orosel

International Review of Law and Economics, 2006, vol. 26, issue 4, 536-556

Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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International Review of Law and Economics is currently edited by C. Ott, A. W. Katz and H-B. Schäfer

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