 ‘Causation-consistent’ liability, economic efficiency and the law of tortsRam Singh () International Review of Law and Economics, 2007, vol. 27, issue 2, 179-203 Abstract: Some legal scholars have argued that the standard modeling of liability rules is inconsistent with the causation requirement of the law of torts. It has been claimed that under the doctrinal notion of causation liability, an injurer is liable only if he was negligent. Moreover, he is liable for only that loss which can be attributed to his negligence and not the entire loss, as is the case with the standard modeling of liability rules. Our analysis shows that the ‘causation-consistent’ liability provides interesting insights on several issues concerning efficiency as well as compensation. Paper shows that when care is bilateral, causation-consistent liability provides a basis for efficiency characterization of the entire class of liability rules. Moreover, it remains a basis for the efficiency classification of liability rules even for bilateral-risk accidents. Keywords: Causation requirement; Causation-consistent liability; Social costs; Efficient liability rules; Unilateral-risk; Bilateral-risk; Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:27:y:2007:i:2:p:179-203 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2007.06.007 Access Statistics for this article International Review of Law and Economics is currently edited by C. Ott, A. W. Katz and H-B. Schäfer More articles in International Review of Law and Economics from Elsevier |
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