EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Competition authority independence, antitrust effectiveness, and institutions

Tay-Cheng Ma

International Review of Law and Economics, 2010, vol. 30, issue 3, 226-235

Abstract: This paper investigates the relationships among the competition authority's independence, antitrust effectiveness, and institutions. The evidence suggests that the authority's effectiveness is empirically associated with the independence. However, it is the de facto and not de jure independence that matters for antitrust effectiveness. Besides, the de facto independence is the main mediating channel through which the institutions influence antitrust effectiveness.

Keywords: Antitrust; effectiveness; Independence; Institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144-8188(10)00010-4
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:30:y:2010:i:3:p:226-235

Access Statistics for this article

International Review of Law and Economics is currently edited by C. Ott, A. W. Katz and H-B. Schäfer

More articles in International Review of Law and Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:30:y:2010:i:3:p:226-235