 Pashtunwali—Law for the lawless, defense for the statelessBruce Benson and Zafar R. Siddiqui International Review of Law and Economics, 2014, vol. 37, issue C, 108-120 Abstract: Despite a large and growing literature on systems of law without coercive central authority, the overwhelmingly dominant view remains that law, as a public good, must be produced by the state. Defense against attempts to subjugate a community is even more widely viewed as a public good and therefore a necessary function of the state. This case study of the Pashtunwali – the customary law followed by the ethnic Pashtun tribes in Afghanistan and Pakistan – illustrates that both law and community defense can be effectively produced without the institutions of a state. The incentives created under Pashtunwali have provided the Pashtun with a decentralized system for maintaining order within and between the tribes for several centuries without the authority of a coercive state. In addition, they have generated a system of spontaneous decentralized defense that has allowed the Pashtun to retain/regain their independence from the states that have tried to colonize or subjugate them for centuries. Keywords: Customary law; Pasthunwali; Retribution; Restitution; Asylum; Mediation; Badal; Thega; Melamastya; Nanawatey; Panah; Jirga (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:37:y:2014:i:c:p:108-120 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2013.07.008 Access Statistics for this article International Review of Law and Economics is currently edited by C. Ott, A. W. Katz and H-B. Schäfer More articles in International Review of Law and Economics from Elsevier |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.