Communicating judicial retirement

Alvaro Bustos and Tonja Jacobi

International Review of Law and Economics, 2015, vol. 43, issue C, 107-118

Abstract: Justices can strategically shape perceptions of their likely retirements, and so influence the President and Senate in choosing an ideologically compatible replacement. Relatively new justices can vote insincerely to affect how their ideologies are perceived, but their strategies are shaped by older justices’ expected retirement probabilities. We show that “strong messages” of retirement are likely when new justices vote insincerely and the new and retiring justices’ ideologies are aligned. “Weak messages” are more likely when new justices vote sincerely or, if they do vote insincerely, the old and new justices’ ideologies are unaligned.

Keywords: Signaling; Communication; Messages; Justices; Supreme Court; Retirement; Nominations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K10 K30 K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Working Paper: Communicating Judicial Retirement (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:43:y:2015:i:c:p:107-118

DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2015.06.004

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