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The two sides of Magna Carta: How good government sometimes wins out over public choice

Richard A. Epstein

International Review of Law and Economics, 2016, vol. 47, issue S, 10-21

Abstract: This article examines two rival interpretations of Magna Carta. It rejects the view that Magna Carta is largely a special interest deal between the King and the Barons, and defends the proposition that by and large it works as a public-regarding document that did much to cure the defects of the feudal and judicial systems that had evolved under King John. A clause-by-clause analysis of the document, dealing with such matters as tenurial succession, marriage, courts and judicial procedures, debtor and creditor arrangements, and property rights and liberties shows that Magna Carta exhibited a high degree of technical excellence. By constantly referring back to ancient customs, Magna Carta introduced sensible reforms, some of which were peculiar to the feudal system, but others of which carry over to similar problems today. The durability of the Magna Carta is justified by its political and legal achievements.

Keywords: Ancient customs; Church and state; Debtor/creditor relations; Magna Carta; Liberties of London; Medieval courts; Marriage; Property rights; Succession tenurial relations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 K19 K49 N43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:47:y:2016:i:s:p:10-21

DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2016.05.003

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