 Superseding Dublin: The European asylum system as a non-cooperative gameEnzo Rossi International Review of Law and Economics, 2017, vol. 51, issue C, 50-59 Abstract: The European asylum system operates according to the ‘Dublin system' rules, where the responsible Member State will be the state through which the asylum seeker first entered the system. This has been immediately a source of controversy between states. A fairer system would be based on quotas, where host countries share the burden according to appropriate criteria, but member states never reached a common agreement. In this paper we offer a vision of the European asylum system as a non-cooperative game where states compete to reduce their asylum burden. As the two different systems (Dublin-like or quotas) lead to different equilibriums, according to the Pareto criterion the preferred system is the one where all states are better able to achieve their national objectives. We examine the conditions under which a relocation system based on quotas may be preferable to the Dublin rules, and why greater consideration of the humanitarian aspects of asylum can favour its adoption and reinforce cohesion of the system. Keywords: European asylum policy; Burden-sharing; Refugees’ rights; Intergovernmental agreement (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:51:y:2017:i:c:p:50-59 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2017.06.003 Access Statistics for this article International Review of Law and Economics is currently edited by C. Ott, A. W. Katz and H-B. Schäfer More articles in International Review of Law and Economics from Elsevier |
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