Law enforcement in a federal system: Endogenous timing of decentralized enforcement effort

Tim Friehe, Cat Lam Pham and Thomas J. Miceli

International Review of Law and Economics, 2018, vol. 56, issue C, 134-141

Abstract: This paper explores how inter-jurisdictional competition in the fight against crime unfolds. Local law enforcement reduces the local level of crime, partly by diverting it elsewhere. We highlight that the commonly considered game structure (i.e., the simultaneous-move game) usually does not arise endogenously, that is, when local law enforcement agencies can choose when to exert effort. This has important implications (e.g., for the equilibrium enforcement levels).

Keywords: Law enforcement; Federalism; Competition; Timing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:56:y:2018:i:c:p:134-141

DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2018.09.002

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