Reputational penalties for environmental violations: A pure and scientific replication study
Mary F. Evans and
Eric W. Wehrly
International Review of Law and Economics, 2019, vol. 57, issue C, 60-72
Our pure replication of Karpoff et al. (2005) confirms their findings of negative abnormal returns and insignificant reputational penalties following the announcement of environmental violations in the last two decades of the twentieth century. A scientific replication using more recent data finds a decrease in the magnitude of negative abnormal returns but similarly insignificant reputational penalties on average. While mean legal penalties for violations are higher in the more recent period, these penalties have decreased relative to firms’ market valuations.
Keywords: Environmental violations; Reputational penalties; Enforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:57:y:2019:i:c:p:60-72
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