EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Identity errors and the standard of proof

Marie Obidzinski and Yves Oytana

International Review of Law and Economics, 2019, vol. 57, issue C, 73-80

Abstract: The paper inquires into the impact of mistakes of identity (ID errors) on the optimal standard of proof. A wrongful conviction due to a mistake of identity happens when an individual is punished for someone else's crime; while the criminal escapes the sanction (at least for this crime). Therefore, the decision to engage in a criminal activity generates a negative externality, as the expected number of ID errors increases. Our objective is to understand how public law enforcement can deal with this type of error by means of the standard of proof. Our main results are twofold. First, we show that too many crimes are committed at equilibrium. Moreover, when the probability of an ID error for each false negative increases, the discrepancy between the socially optimal deterrence threshold and the equilibrium deterrence threshold is exacerbated. Second, we find that the optimal standard of proof is higher in the presence of ID errors when the net effect on punishment costs is negative, i.e. when the savings induced by the lower probability of a conviction for each crime exceed the costs induced by less deterrence.

Keywords: Mistakes of identity; Standard of proof; Deterrence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144818818303260
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Identity errors and the standard of proof (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:57:y:2019:i:c:p:73-80

DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2018.12.001

Access Statistics for this article

International Review of Law and Economics is currently edited by C. Ott, A. W. Katz and H-B. Schäfer

More articles in International Review of Law and Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:57:y:2019:i:c:p:73-80