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Apportionment of liability by the stochastic Shapley value

Jeong-Yoo Kim and Seewoo Lee

International Review of Law and Economics, 2019, vol. 60, issue C

Abstract: If multiple defendants are jointly liable for a plaintiff's harm, the court must determine the apportionments of the damages among them. Recently, in a series of papers, Dehez and Ferey (2013) and Ferey and Dehez (2016a,b) took a cooperative game theory approach, and used the Shapley value and the weighted Shapley value to determine the shares especially in the case of sequential acts. In this paper, we argue that their allocation rule is not strictly fair if we take even a small random error into account. We alternatively propose the stochastic Shapley value which extends the definition of the Shapley value to stochastic cooperative games and show that it satisfies ex post efficiency, symmetry, dummy, feasibility and fairness.

Keywords: Fairness; Joint liability; Stochastic cooperative game theory; Stochastic Shapley value; Threshold case (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2019.105860

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