EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Disposition time and the utilization of prior judicial decisions: Evidence from a civil law country

Michael Berlemann () and Robin Christmann

International Review of Law and Economics, 2020, vol. 62, issue C

Abstract: Court delay frustrates economic behavior. This paper examines the nexus between the case disposition time and the availability of prior court decisions for the civil law. We model litigation as a rent-seeking game, and find that prior court decisions curb strategic behavior in similar cases. Thus, the excessive use of party resources in litigation, such as time, is reduced if prior decisions clarify the interpretation of the law. Using judge-level data, we provide empirical evidence on a potential role of such ‘precedents’ for case disposition time in a civil law country. Our results show that the availability of prior decisions contributes to a significant reduction in disposition time. Moreover, the reduction in the duration of trials becomes stronger when the stock of previous court decisions grows. We conclude that the utilization of prior judicial decisions plays a crucial role for the efficiency of justice also in civil law countries.

Keywords: Legal citation; Jurisprudence constante; Case resolution; Court delay; Precedent (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K15 K40 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144818819301401
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:62:y:2020:i:c:s0144818819301401

DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2020.105887

Access Statistics for this article

International Review of Law and Economics is currently edited by C. Ott, A. W. Katz and H-B. Schäfer

More articles in International Review of Law and Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:62:y:2020:i:c:s0144818819301401