Consent or coordination? assemblies in early medieval Europe

Andrew T. Young

International Review of Law and Economics, 2022, vol. 72, issue C

Abstract: The standard political economy narrative of representative assemblies in Western Europe is one of political bargaining and credible commitments. Monarchs sought to bargain with the leading men of the realms, exchanging their commitments on various policies for revenues and other resources. This narrative has been forcibly challenged by Boucoyannis (2015, 2021) who points out that, in the High Middle Ages, it was strong monarchs who were able to compel the leading men of their realms to assemblies She argues that strong monarchs were able to leverage their subjects’ demand for adjudication (justice) to compel their attendance; and then extract their promises of resources. In this paper, I add to the discussion of the origins of representative institutions. Prior to the High Middle Ages, assemblies were ubiquitous but scarcely democratic. I provide a coordination model of assemblies that provides a compelling account of these early medieval assemblies. Similar to arguments put forth by Hardin (1989, 1999), Ordeshook (1992), Weingast (1997), Weingast (2005), and Hadfield and Weingast (2014) regarding modern de jure constitutions, I argue that assemblies allowed monarchs to provide focal point around which they could coordinate their leading men. There was relatively little meaningful bargaining at these assemblies; rather, monarchs provided ceremony and spectacle meant to focus their leading men on their agendas.

Keywords: Representative assemblies; Constitutions; Coordination devices; Medieval Europe; Political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B52 K10 P00 P16 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:72:y:2022:i:c:s0144818822000527

DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2022.106096

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