 Variability in punishment, risk preferences and crime deterrenceInternational Review of Law and Economics, 2023, vol. 75, issue C Abstract: This work studies for the first time the effect on crime deterrence of variability in punishment under different assumptions on criminals risk preferences. We show that when criminals are risk averse, greater variability in punishment reduces the incentive to commit crimes, and that the opposite holds in the case of risk loving. The linkages between certainty of punishment, initial wealth and the incentive to commit crimes are also analyzed. We then analyze the effects of greater variability in punishment on deterrence policies founded on punishment severity, showing that this effect is positive if criminals are prudent and negative if they are imprudent. Lastly, we analyze for the first time variability in punishment as an instrument of deterrence policy. This analysis determines the optimal level of variability in the two cases of homogeneity and heterogeneity in risk preference. Keywords: Punishment; Variability in punishment; Risk preferences; Crime deterrence; Crime deterrence policy; Risk aversion; Risk loving; Prudence (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:75:y:2023:i:c:s0144818823000182 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2023.106140 Access Statistics for this article International Review of Law and Economics is currently edited by C. Ott, A. W. Katz and H-B. Schäfer More articles in International Review of Law and Economics from Elsevier |
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