Inequality snowballing

Daniel Giraldo Paez and Zachary Liscow

International Review of Law and Economics, 2024, vol. 77, issue C

Abstract: It has long been argued that efficient policies tend to provide larger legal entitlements to the rich than to the poor. This article shows how efficient legal rules can become even more skewed against the poor over time by sowing the seeds of their own vicious cycles. Repeated application over time of these rules can lead to increasingly adverse outcomes for the poor, which the article calls “policy snowballing”.

Keywords: Taxes and transfers; Economic inequality; Torts; Dynamics; Efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144818823000583
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:77:y:2024:i:c:s0144818823000583

DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2023.106180

Access Statistics for this article

International Review of Law and Economics is currently edited by C. Ott, A. W. Katz and H-B. Schäfer

More articles in International Review of Law and Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().