How acceptable is optimal deterrence?

Michał Kłusek

International Review of Law and Economics, 2024, vol. 78, issue C

Abstract: The article examines the social acceptability of optimal deterrence policies. While there is considerable research on intuitions regarding punishment and the counter-intuitive nature of economic reasoning, the problem of whether decisions based on optimal deterrence are acceptable remains inadequately researched. Two studies examined how acceptance rates vary for different decisions implementing optimal deterrence theory. They demonstrate that (1) policies increasing punishment severity are more acceptable than those decreasing it; (2) changes at the level of penal policy are more acceptable than individual court rulings; (3) acceptance rates decrease as the magnitude of change increases; (4) strict adherence to optimal deterrence theory’s recommendations does not significantly affect the acceptability of the decisions. In addition, no optimal deterrence policies were accepted, on average, or by the majority of participants.

Keywords: Intuitions; Law & economics; Optimal deterrence; Punishment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:78:y:2024:i:c:s0144818824000140

DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106194

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