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Judiciary-driven finance: Quasi-experimental evidence from specialized financial adjudication institutions in China

Kangyun Bao and Shenghua Lu

International Review of Law and Economics, 2024, vol. 80, issue C

Abstract: The "law and finance" paradigm posits that legal institutions play a crucial role in financial development; however, China has long been considered an exception. This study challenges that assumption by examining how improvements in the judiciary affect financial development in China. Using a quasi-natural experiment (i.e., staggered difference-in-difference estimation) over a twenty-year period, we find that the establishment of specialized financial adjudication institutions (i.e., financial courts and tribunals) in certain prefecture-level cities significantly reduces financing constraints for local listed companies. Further heterogeneity tests show that these effects are more pronounced among private enterprises, small and medium-sized enterprises, and companies in the central and western regions. Through the analysis of representative practices and interviews with relevant judges and enterprises, we find that China's financial judiciary demonstrates efficiency and proactiveness. Additionally, political considerations enable courts to regulate finance and maintain stability, improving the local financial legal environments and reducing transaction costs for market participants. By investigating the causal relationship between judicial reforms and financial development, our findings provide new insights into the "law and finance" theory and offer policy implications for addressing financial development gaps and promoting financial inclusion in emerging markets.

Keywords: Specialized financial adjudication institutions; Financing constraints; Law and finance; Staggered difference-in-difference estimation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:80:y:2024:i:c:s0144818824000474

DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106227

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International Review of Law and Economics is currently edited by C. Ott, A. W. Katz and H-B. Schäfer

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