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Do Chinese courts apply the “Hand Formula”: Empirical evidence from cases related to the duty of safety protection

Haoyi Zhang

International Review of Law and Economics, 2025, vol. 83, issue C

Abstract: This study analyzes over ten thousand judgments by Chinese courts in cases related to the duty of safety protection, using a sharp regression discontinuity design to examine the causal relationship between the ratio of expected loss to the burden of precaution and the determination of defendant negligence. The findings reveal that the decision-making process, guided by the Hand Formula, explains approximately 20% to 30% of judicial decisions. When focusing specifically on a cost–benefit analysis mindset, this process accounts for approximately 10% to 15% of decisions. These results indicate that the Hand Formula significantly influences judicial practice in China. Moreover, the cost–benefit analysis mindset inherent in the Hand Formula is not only a theoretical pursuit of economic efficiency but also reflects a universal intuitive sense of fairness and justice beyond positive legal norms.

Keywords: Tort law; Hand Formula; Duty of safety protection; Cost–benefit analysis; Behavioral law and economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D91 K13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:83:y:2025:i:c:s0144818825000353

DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106279

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International Review of Law and Economics is currently edited by C. Ott, A. W. Katz and H-B. Schäfer

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