Notice-and-takedown as dispute resolution: An empirical analysis of GitHub notices

Pengfei Zhang and Ji Li

International Review of Law and Economics, 2025, vol. 83, issue C

Abstract: The Section 512(c) notice-and-takedown regime is a primary mechanism that enforces online copyright in the U.S. The objective is to enable the disputants to settle on their own, but asymmetric information can lead to claimant abuse and bargaining impasse, as critics of Section 512 have pointed out. This paper studies the dispute resolution aspect of the notice-and-takedown. We evaluate two platform remedies (chance-to-change policy and revise-and-resubmit policy) and the recent trend of professionalization in the context of GitHub. We collect a novel sample of 4,684 takedown notices from GitHub and use it to empirically test the disputants’ settlement behavior. Our estimates show that the chance-to-change policy is associated with a higher settlement rate, whereas the revise-and-resubmit policy has little effect. The results are consistent with a signaling theory between the copyright owner and the infringer. To address the potential selection effects of GitHub, we apply text analysis to quantify and control latent attributes of the notices, including writing styles and informativeness, in addition to more substantive features. We also discuss the role of expert representatives and certain textual characteristics that appear influential in the dispute resolution process.

Keywords: Notice and takedown; Signaling; Pretrial settlement; Text analysis; Propensity score matching; GitHub (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 K24 K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:83:y:2025:i:c:s0144818825000377

DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106281

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