Do directors perform for pay?

Renee Adams and Daniel Ferreira

Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2008, vol. 46, issue 1, 154-171

Abstract: Many corporations reward their outside directors with a modest fee for each board meeting they attend. Using a large panel data set on director attendance behavior in publicly-listed firms for the period 1996-2003, we provide robust evidence that directors are less likely to have attendance problems at board meetings when board meeting fees are higher. This is surprising since meeting fees, on average roughly $1,000, represent an arguably small fraction of the total wealth of a representative director in our sample. Thus, corporate directors appear to perform for even very small financial rewards.

Keywords: Directors; Executive; compensation; Incentives; Attendance; Board; meetings (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (119)

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Working Paper: Do Directors Perform for Pay? (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:46:y:2008:i:1:p:154-171

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