The quality of accounting information in politically connected firms

Paul K. Chaney, Mara Faccio () and David Parsley

Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2011, vol. 51, issue 1-2, 58-76

Abstract: We document that the quality of earnings reported by politically connected firms is significantly poorer than that of similar non-connected companies. Our results are not due to firms with ex-ante poor earnings quality establishing connections more often. Instead, our results suggest that, because of a lesser need to respond to market pressures to increase the quality of information, connected companies can afford disclosing lower quality accounting information. In particular, lower quality reported earnings is associated with a higher cost of debt only for the non-politically connected firms in the sample.

Keywords: M40; M41; G15; Quality; of; information; Accruals; quality; Political; ties (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (299)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The quality of accounting information in politically connected firms (2011)
Working Paper: The Quality of Accounting Information in Politically Connected Firms (2009)
Working Paper: The Quality of Accounting Information in Politically Connected Firms (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:51:y:2011:i:1-2:p:58-76

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