Political considerations in the decision of Chinese SOEs to list in Hong Kong

Mingyi Hung, T.J. Wong and Tianyu Zhang

Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2012, vol. 53, issue 1, 435-449

Abstract: This paper investigates why Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with strong political connections (i.e., politically connected firms) are more likely to list overseas than non-politically connected firms. We find that connected firms' post-overseas listing performance is worse than that of non-connected firms. This evidence suggests that connected firms' managers list their firms overseas for private (political) benefits. Consistent with this private benefits explanation, we further find that connected firms' managers are more likely to receive political media coverage or a promotion to a senior government position subsequent to overseas listing than domestic listing.

Keywords: Partial privatization; China; Overseas listing; Political connection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 L33 P31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (72)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:53:y:2012:i:1:p:435-449

DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2011.10.001

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