A review of archival auditing research

Mark DeFond and Jieying Zhang

Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2014, vol. 58, issue 2, 275-326

Abstract: We define higher audit quality as greater assurance of high financial reporting quality. Researchers use many proxies for audit quality, with little guidance on choosing among them. We provide a framework for systematically evaluating their unique strengths and weaknesses. Because it is inextricably intertwined with financial reporting quality, audit quality also depends on firms’ innate characteristics and financial reporting systems. Our review of the models commonly used to disentangle these constructs suggests the need for better conceptual guidance. Finally, we urge more research on the role of auditor and client competency in driving audit quality.

Keywords: Auditing; Audit quality; Audit quality proxies; Audit quality models; Auditor incentives; Client incentives; Competencies; Financial reporting quality; M40; M42; C42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (404)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:58:y:2014:i:2:p:275-326

DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.09.002

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