The association between corporate general counsel and firm credit risk

Charles Ham and Kevin Koharki

Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2016, vol. 61, issue 2, 274-293

Abstract: This paper examines whether bond market participants alter their credit risk assessments of firms that appoint the corporate general counsel (GC) to senior management. GCs may place less emphasis on their gatekeeping responsibilities upon appointment to senior management, thus potentially resulting in increased firm credit risk. Using changes in firm-level credit ratings and credit default swap spreads to proxy for changes in credit risk, we find a positive association between GC promotions to senior management and increases in firm credit risk. Additionally, the increased personal liability for GCs under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act only partially mitigates this association.

Keywords: Credit risk; Credit rating agency; General counsel (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G24 K00 M40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:61:y:2016:i:2:p:274-293

DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2016.01.001

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