Voluntary disclosure incentives: Evidence from the municipal bond market

Christine Cuny

Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2016, vol. 62, issue 1, 87-102

Abstract: I investigate the trade-off between capital market incentives, reputational concerns, and administrative costs in the public disclosure decisions of municipal bond issuers. After Ambac׳s bankruptcy, issuers of insured debt increase disclosure relative to issuers of uninsured debt. After local per capita income declines or expenditures increase, issuers, particularly those with strong electoral incentives and weak voter oversight, reduce disclosure. After the implementation of an online filing repository, issuers with few dissemination channels increase disclosure relative to other issuers. Overall, my findings support a positive relationship between voluntary disclosure, risk, and low-cost dissemination, to the extent reputational capital is not threatened.

Keywords: Voluntary disclosure; Risk; Political economy; Information transmission; Municipal debt (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D81 D83 H74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:62:y:2016:i:1:p:87-102

DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2016.04.004

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