Leaving before bad times: Does the labor market penalize preemptive director resignations?

Ying Dou

Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2017, vol. 63, issue 2, 161-178

Abstract: When firms experience negative events such as lawsuits or earnings restatements, their directors also suffer. But what about those who leave shortly before the events? I show that directors who leave prior to negative events experience greater declines in the number of their directorships than directors who stay through the events, but smaller declines than directors who leave after the events. These declines do not appear to be voluntary or driven by forced departures. Instead, they appear to be the results of labor market penalties. The results suggest that resigning pre-emptively does not protect directors from labor market penalties.

Keywords: Director departures; Reputational concerns; Board seats; Labor market settling-up (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:63:y:2017:i:2:p:161-178

DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2017.02.002

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