Discussion of “Managing reputation: Evidence from biographies of corporate directors✰

Darius Miller

Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2018, vol. 66, issue 2, 470-475

Abstract: Gow et al. (2018) (henceforth GWY) examine how directors’ reputation concerns influence the proxy statement disclosure of their business experience. They find that reputation concerns combine with lax disclosure requirements to cause directors’ employment at troubled firms to be omitted from proxy filings. Further, the evidence suggests that these misrepresentations succeed in misleading both the labor and capital markets. In this discussion, I review the literature to highlight the importance of GWY's contribution. I also discuss the study's implications, identify some of its limitations as well as highlight several unanswered questions that provide opportunities for future research.

Keywords: Director reputation; Disclosure regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:66:y:2018:i:2:p:470-475

DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2018.08.006

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