Do women managers keep firms out of trouble? Evidence from corporate litigation and policies
Binay K. Adhikari,
Anup Agrawal and
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2019, vol. 67, issue 1, 202-225
We find that firms where women have more power in the top management team, measured by female executives’ plurality and pay slice, face fewer operations-related lawsuits. This effect is robust to several treatments of endogeneity and does not appear to be driven by female executives' greater willingness to settle the cases. Evidence from a simultaneous equations approach suggests that firms where women executives have more power avoid lawsuits partly by avoiding some risky but value-increasing firm policies, such as more aggressive R&D, intensive advertising, and policies inimical to other parties.
Keywords: Women executives; Corporate litigation; Corporate policies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:67:y:2019:i:1:p:202-225
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