The role of accounting information in an era of fake news

Betty Liu and Austin Moss

Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2025, vol. 79, issue 2

Abstract: We offer empirical evidence on the role of accounting information in shaping the incentives to produce fake news. We document that fake news authors strategically (1) publish their articles near earnings announcements, leveraging the widespread market attention these events attract, and (2) within the near-announcement window, avoid publishing post-announcement when investors are less susceptible to fake news due to the disclosure of accounting information. In extending our analyses to the broader accounting information environment, we find that fake news authors are less likely to target firms with more robust accounting information and elicit lower market reactions when doing so. These results highlight both ex-ante and ex-post roles that accounting information plays in safeguarding firms from financial disinformation.

Keywords: Accounting information; Fake news; Seeking Alpha; Financial disinformation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 G14 M41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:79:y:2025:i:2:s0165410124000946

DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101764

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