Locational and monopoly rents at airports: creating them and shifting them

Peter Forsyth

Journal of Air Transport Management, 2004, vol. 10, issue 1, 51-60

Abstract: Airports have the potential because of their monopoly position to extract economic rent. This paper is concerned with variations in the rent obtained by airports and the factors that influence this. It extends the narrow focus on an airport's rent acquisition per se to see to what extent an airport has the potential it has to redistribute rent away from other rent earning agencies. Finally, it looks at the wider efficiency issue of whether rent seeking by airports can stimulate dynamic efficiency in terms of the types and quality of services that it may offer.

Keywords: Airports; Monopoly power; Economic efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jaitra:v:10:y:2004:i:1:p:51-60

DOI: 10.1016/j.jairtraman.2003.10.003

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