Impact of landing fees on airlines’ choice of aircraft size and service frequency in duopoly markets

Wenbin Wei

Journal of Air Transport Management, 2006, vol. 12, issue 6, 288-292

Abstract: A one-shot simultaneous game-theoretic model is applied in a duopoly market to investigate how airport landing fees could influence airlines’ decisions on aircraft size and service frequency. It is found that higher landing fees will force airlines to use larger aircraft and less frequency, with higher load factor for the same number of passengers. It is also found that airlines will be better off if some of the extra landing fees are returned to airlines as a bonus for airlines using larger aircraft, which consequently reduces airport congestion.

Keywords: Landing fee; Aircraft size; Airport congestion; Airline competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jaitra:v:12:y:2006:i:6:p:288-292

DOI: 10.1016/j.jairtraman.2006.07.008

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