 An incentive pricing mechanism for efficient airport slot allocation in EuropeAlessandro Avenali, Tiziana D'Alfonso, Claudio Leporelli, Giorgio Matteucci, Alberto Nastasi and Pierfrancesco Reverberi Journal of Air Transport Management, 2015, vol. 42, issue C, 27-36 Abstract: We define a supervised market mechanism to deal with the airport slot allocation problem. This mechanism is based on the principles underlying the AIP model for regulation of radio spectrum. Incentive prices for airport slots should reflect an estimate of the marginal value of each slot to end users. We compute this value by assessing the downgrade in the provision of the air transport service, both in terms of quantity (i.e. number of transported passengers) and quality (i.e. passenger travel times), should access to any given slot be denied. Incentive prices consider interdependencies among slots at different airports. We argue that, in principle, incentive prices may better align private and social decisions over the use of slots compared with the outcomes of pure market interactions (such as auctions and trading). Keywords: Airport slot allocation; Congestion; Administered incentive pricing; Market mechanisms (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jaitra:v:42:y:2015:i:c:p:27-36 DOI: 10.1016/j.jairtraman.2014.07.009 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Air Transport Management is currently edited by Anne Graham More articles in Journal of Air Transport Management from Elsevier |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.