Airport subsidies and congestion in North America: the need for accounts and a regulator within virtual World Trade Organization rules

Marc Gaudry

Journal of Air Transport Management, 2001, vol. 7, issue 1, 35-41

Abstract: We examine the potential role of airport slot trading as a congestion internalization mechanism in North America. We argue that the air transportation system is massively subsidized both in Canada and in the United States and that the imposition of prices that recover full direct costs, including environmental costs, as one would expect if air transport were brought within World Trade Organization rules, would severely reduce the potential need for any slot-trading scheme. We also argue that in many airports a severe problem of monopoly regulation would arise if current pricing control institutions were modified, as Canada has started to do. Slot values are a buffer that would also residually reflect true demand-driven scarcity not captured by carrier hub dominance, landing fees and airport passenger charges.

Keywords: Airport competition; Canada; United States; Air transport subsidies; Slot trading (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jaitra:v:7:y:2001:i:1:p:35-41

DOI: 10.1016/S0969-6997(00)00026-0

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