Family control, board independence and earnings management: Evidence based on Hong Kong firms

Bikki Jaggi, Sidney Leung and Ferdinand Gul ()

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 2009, vol. 28, issue 4, 281-300

Abstract: In this study, we document that independent corporate boards of Hong Kong firms provide effective monitoring of earnings management, which suggests that despite differences in institutional environments, corporate board independence is important to ensure high-quality financial reporting. The findings also show that the monitoring effectiveness of corporate boards is moderated in family-controlled firms, either through ownership concentration or the presence of family members on corporate boards. The results based on firms reporting small earnings increases provide additional support for our finding that the monitoring effectiveness of independent corporate boards is moderated in family-controlled firms.

Keywords: Corporate; governance; Earnings; management; Earnings; quality; Family; ownership; concentration; Family; board; members (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (104)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jappol:v:28:y:2009:i:4:p:281-300

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