Controlling shareholders' tunneling and executive compensation: Evidence from China
Kun Wang and
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 2011, vol. 30, issue 1, 89-100
Conflict of interests between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders could affect executive compensation contracts. In this paper, we use data on Chinese listed companies and show that controlling shareholders' tunneling reduces the pay-performance sensitivity of executive compensation. These results suggest that while incentive payment schemes are generally adopted in Chinese listed companies, controlling shareholders who obtain private benefits from listed companies have less incentive to strengthen the relationship between executive pay and firm performance.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (40) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jappol:v:30:y::i:1:p:89-100
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy is currently edited by L. A. Gordon
More articles in Journal of Accounting and Public Policy from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Nithya Sathishkumar ().