 International environmental agreements between asymmetric countries: A repeated game analysisNobuyuki Takashima Japan and the World Economy, 2018, vol. 48, issue C, 38-44 Abstract: This paper introduces a new approach to performing a relaxed analysis using a repeated game to achieve an international environmental agreement (IEA) with the full participation of countries when an asymmetric relationship exists with respect to emissions-related benefits and environmental damage. Our model reveals that a stable IEA depends on the magnitude of the relationship between the benefit-cost ratios of the two types of countries, not on their compositions. That is, the number of punishing countries for a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium depends on the benefit-cost ratios of the two types of countries. Our results show that a global cooperation on abatement among the two types of countries can be achieved by addressing deviation through flexibly selecting punishing countries based on benefit-cost ratios. Keywords: International environmental agreements; Subgame perfect equilibrium; Renegotiation-proof; Repeated game; Asymmetric countries (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:japwor:v:48:y:2018:i:c:p:38-44 DOI: 10.1016/j.japwor.2018.08.001 Access Statistics for this article Japan and the World Economy is currently edited by Robert Dekle and Yasushi Hamao More articles in Japan and the World Economy from Elsevier |
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