Founding family ownership, stock market returns, and agency problems
Nicolas Eugster and
Dusan Isakov
Journal of Banking & Finance, 2019, vol. 107, issue C, -
Abstract:
This paper explores the relationship between founding family ownership and stock market returns. Using the entire population of non-financial firms listed on the Swiss stock market for 2003–2013, we find that the stock returns of family firms are significantly higher than those of non-family firms after adjusting the returns for different firm characteristics and risk factors. Family firms generate an annual abnormal return of 2.8% to 7.1%. We also document that family firms potentially having more agency problems earn higher abnormal returns. Our evidence suggests that outside investors receive a premium for holding shares of these firms as they are exposed to the specific agency problems present in family firms.
Keywords: Family firm; Ownership structure; Abnormal returns; Performance; Earnings surprise (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G14 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)
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Working Paper: Founding family ownership, stock market returns, and agency problems (2019)
Working Paper: Founding family ownership,stock market returns, and agency problems (2017) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:107:y:2019:i:c:7
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2019.07.020
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