Directors who serve multiple pension funds: Are they conflicted or skilled?

Elizabeth Ooi

Journal of Banking & Finance, 2020, vol. 113, issue C

Abstract: Directors who hold concurrent directorships within a single industry may have an information advantage or face conflicts of interest. This practice is permitted in the Australian pension fund industry, even between competing funds. Results show that funds with directors who hold competing board seats are associated with poor fund performance. Non-competing seats are associated with better fund performance in complex funds. Directors favor positions which align with personal and reputational incentives. Overall, the opposing arguments regarding the effect of multiple directorships are not mutually exclusive but dependent on cross-sectional variation in fund characteristics and the types of directorships held.

Keywords: Pension funds; Multiple directorships; Fund Performance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G23 G30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:113:y:2020:i:c:s0378426620300315

DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2020.105764

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