Inside the director network: When directors trade or hold inside, interlock, and unconnected stocks

Henk Berkman, Paul Koch and P. Joakim Westerholm

Journal of Banking & Finance, 2020, vol. 118, issue C

Abstract: Analysis of shareholdings reveals that corporate directors generate positive alpha when they hold board interlocked stocks, where they are not an insider but a current co-board member is. In contrast, directors do not outperform when they hold inside stocks or other stocks unconnected to the board network. Analysis of trades shows that directors outperform when they buy or sell their own company's stock as insiders. They also outperform when they buy interlocked stocks. Results are similar for trades made before firm-specific information events. We also find limited support for the hypothesis that industry familiarity improves performance.

Keywords: Insider trading; Informed trading; Shareholdings; Information asymmetry; Interlocking directorship; Director network; Social network; Industry familiarity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G12 G14 G18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:118:y:2020:i:c:s0378426620301588

DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2020.105892

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