The impact of labor mobility restrictions on managerial actions: Evidence from the mutual fund industry

Gjergji Cici, Mario Hendriock and Alexander Kempf

Journal of Banking & Finance, 2021, vol. 122, issue C

Abstract: We examine how labor mobility restrictions in the form of non-compete clauses in employment contracts affect employee behavior. Using the mutual fund industry as testing laboratory, we show that fund managers respond to higher job termination costs due to increased enforceability of non-compete clauses by increasing their contribution to their employer's revenue. They do so by improving their fund performance, while also increasing window dressing to attract new customers and increase fee revenue. Furthermore, the change in incentives disciplines managers’ risk taking, as shown by noticeable reductions in their portfolio risk, portfolio deviations from peers, and engagement in fund tournaments.

Keywords: Labor mobility; Non-compete clauses; Mutual funds; Career concerns (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D86 G23 K12 K31 M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:122:y:2021:i:c:s0378426620302569

DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2020.105994

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