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Corruption transfer and acquisition performance

Chia-Wei Huang, Chih-Yen Lin, Wen-Chun Lin and Yun-Ching Tsai

Journal of Banking & Finance, 2022, vol. 135, issue C

Abstract: The relationship between corruption and acquisition performance is examined in this study, with a focus on stakeholder support. The findings indicate that total acquisition-related gains are reduced when firms with lower corruption pressures acquire targets with higher corruption pressures. Moreover, a negative relationship is highlighted between the corruption differential and the level of support provided by stakeholders. In addition, merger and acquisition deals with higher corruption differences receive lower average support from suppliers, customers, and employees. The evidence suggests that stakeholder commitment is a possible channel through which corruption affects corporate performance. Implementing anticorruption efforts and operating as a multinational corporation are two important factors that may reduce the impact of corruption on acquisition performance.

Keywords: Corruption; Mergers and acquisitions; Corporate performance; Synergistic gains; Stakeholder support (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 J53 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:135:y:2022:i:c:s0378426621003204

DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2021.106369

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