Takeover deterrence with state ownership: Evidence from China

Zhiwei Su and Yi Xue

Journal of Banking & Finance, 2023, vol. 146, issue C

Abstract: This study examines the role of Chinese state ownership in deterring takeovers. We document state ownership’s reduction in firms’ susceptibility to potential takeovers. Using staggered privatization of the state-owned shareholders of public firms, as shocks to the deterrent effect of the state, we find that state-owned shareholders can insulate their portfolio firms from potential takeovers. The deterrent effect of state ownership is concentrated in strategic industries and well-functioning assets, alleviating managerial short-termism.

Keywords: Deterrence; Privatization; State-owned enterprises; Takeover (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 G34 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:146:y:2023:i:c:s0378426622002692

DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2022.106689

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