 Does non-punitive regulation diminish stock price crash risk?Jing Lu and Yuhang Qiu Journal of Banking & Finance, 2023, vol. 148, issue C Abstract: This study investigates the impact of non-punitive regulation on stock price crash risk. We use the inquiry letter issued by the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in China as a proxy for non-punitive regulation. The results demonstrate that stock price crash risk decreases after the issuance of the inquiry letter. The reduction in crash risk is more pronounced for firms receiving a more detailed inquiry letter (or an inquiry letter requiring intermediary agencies to provide professional opinions) and for those that have more incentives or are more easily able to conceal bad news. The firm's response to the corresponding inquiry letter reduces crash risk. Furthermore, the impact of the inquiry letter on reducing crash risk is short-term, not long-term. These results indicate that the inquiry letter reduces crash risk by playing its information discovery role. Keywords: Inquiry letter; Crash risk; Information asymmetry; Non-punitive regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:148:y:2023:i:c:s0378426622003119 DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2022.106731 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Banking & Finance is currently edited by Ike Mathur More articles in Journal of Banking & Finance from Elsevier |
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